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193_ASHINGTON' CASE LAW
v. Connecticut,2 set out this test for the admissibility of a confession
under the fourteenth amendment due process clause:
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained*
choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess; it may be used"
against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity
for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his'confession
offends due process.' 3
Compare with this test the very similar requirement under the fifth
amendment, namely,, that "the confession be made freely, voluntarily,
and without compulsion or inducement of any sort." 4
In conclusion, the test for the admissibility of confession would be
virtually the same whether the Washington court used the self-incri-
mination provision of the state constitution (interpreted in accordance
with the analogous provision of the federal constitution) or the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In either case the te'st
would preclude the use of RCW 10.58.030.
MICTHAEL D. GARVEY"
Double Jeopardy. In State v. Connors,' the Washington State .St-
preme Court held that a defendant had been placed in jeopardy when,
sua sponte, a trial court erroneously declared a mistrial over his objec-
tion. A later retrial of the defendant therefore constituted double
jeopardy.
At the first trial a jury had been 'impaneled and. sworn to try the
defendant. No opening statements had been made, and no evidence
'had been introduced. Although the defendant had not consented to
a separation of the jury, several members of the jury separated them-
selves from the rest of the panel during the noon recess. This fact
was called to the attention of counsel, and the defendant consented
to a separation of the rest of the jurors for the remainder of the recess.
Afterwards, on its own motion, the court declared a mistrial over a
timely objection by the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant was
tried and convicted of an identical charge, over his objection based
on double jeopardy.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed. The court held (1) that the
mistrial had been improperly granted, and, (2) that the second trial
32367 U.S. 568 (1961).
33 Id. at 607.
34 Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 620 (1896).
3159 Wn.2d 879, 371 P.2d 541 (1962).
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constituted double jeopardy. To reach the latter conclusion the court
reasoned that a mistrial which is improperly granted over a timely
objection, violates the right of a defendant to a trial by a jury which
he has accepted and which has been impaneled and sworn to try
his case. There is an admitted incongruity in the court's position: On
the one hand, the trial judge declared the mistrial in an effort to insure
procedural fairness to the defendant; yet on the other hand, this effort
was held by the appellate court to bar a second fairly-prosecuted action.
Washington statutory provisions concerning the subject of double
jeopardy are in conformity with the federal constitution. In Palko v.
Connecticut,' the United States Supreme Court held that, without
violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a state
may retry an acquitted defendant, where the acquittal was erroneous.
Since the federal constitutional provision against double jeopardy was
found to be "not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,"'
it was found not to be a part of the fourteenth amendment. This inter-
pretation affords the states considerable latitude in framing their own
law with respect to double jeopardy. Washington has availed itself
of this opportunity.
There are several relevant Washington statutes.4 One of them
specifically allows retrial of defendants in felony cases where, in cer-
tain specified circumstances, the prosecution has been dismissed: 5
RCW 10.43.010 Dismissal, when a bar. An order dismissing a prose-
cution under the provisions of RCW 10.37.020, RCW 10.46.010, and
RCW 10.46.090 shall bar another prosecution for a misdemeanor or
2 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
3302 U.S. at 325. In a recent case, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), the
Court traced the development of the constitutional provision against double jeopardy
and its relation to state prosecution, concluding by rejecting a defense argument that
Palko should be overruled. For another recent discussion of the federal constitutional
provision against double jeopardy in relation to state prosecutions, see Hoag v. New
Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) ; Annot., 2 L. Ed. 2d 2020 (1958).
4 RCW 10.43.010 Dismissal, when a bar, incorporating by reference; "RCW
10.37.020 Indictment or information-ITime for filing; RCW 10.46.010 Trial within
sixty days; and, RCW 10.46.090 Nolle prosequi." For the text of RCW 10.37.020
and RCW 10.46.010, see note 6 infra. For the text of RCW 10.46.090, see note 7
infra. Constitutionality of this statutory scheme has been upheld on the grounds that
where an indictment or information has not been filed (RCW 10.37.020) or where
trial has not begun (RCW 10.46.010), prosecution has not proceeded to a point
where jeopardy has attached, and, where the action is dismissed because of prejudicial
error, in the furtherance of justice, (RCW 10.46.090) the first action could not
subject the defendant to jeopardy because no valid conviction could result. On this
subject, see the annotations to RCWr 10.43.010. See also, State v. Silver, 152 Wash.
686, 279 Pac. 82 (1929), State v. Burns, 54 Wash. 113, 102 Pac. 886 (1909), State v.
Costello, 29 Wash. 366, 69 Pac. 1099 (1902).
5 Wash. Sess. Laws 1881, ch. 66 § 777.
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gross misdemeanor where the prosecution dismissed charged the same
misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor; but in no other case shall such
order of dismissal bar another prosecution.8
Under another statute, RCW 10.46.090 (listed in RCW 10.43.010
above)," the court has discretionary power to order dismissal on its
own motion in the furtherance of justice. When a court properly
exercises its discretion, then RCW 10.43.010 specifically provides that
a dismissal shall not bar a subsequent felony prosecution.
These statutory provisions and the general question presented in
the Connors case have previously been before the Washington court.
In the first case, State v. Kinghorns the jury had been impaneled and
introduction of evidence had started when the defendant moved for
dismissal on the grounds that he had not been arraigned and had not
pleaded. Denying the motion, the court arraigned the defendant and
entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution then moved to dismiss,
and the court granted this motion over objection by the defendant.
Kinghorn was promptly retried and convicted over his timely objection
based on double jeopardy. On appeal, the supreme court reversed,
holding that
when the accused has been placed upon trial in a court of competent
jurisdiction on a sufficient indictment, before a jury legally impaneled
and sworn, the constitutional peril has attached, and a discharge of
the jury without good cause and without the consent of the accused
is equivalent to an acquittal. (Emphasis added.) 9
The doctrine of double jeopardy was properly applied in Kinghorn
to bar the second conviction. It has long been held that the statute
allowing retrials in felony cases must be strictly construed (because it
ORCW 10.37.020 and RCW 10.46.010 are quoted in full here; however, neither is
applicable to the subject of this casenote. RCW 10.37.020 Indictment or informatilo-
Time for filing. "Whenever a person has been held to answer to any criminal charge,
if an indictment be not found or information filed against him within thirty days,
the court shall order the prosecution to be dismissed; unless good cause to the con-
trary be shown." RCW 10.46.010 Trial within sixty days. "If a defendant indicted
or informed against for an offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his own
application, be not brought to trial within sixty days after the indictment is found or
the information filed, the court shall order it to be dismissed, unless good cause to
the contrary is shown."
7RCW 10.46.090 "Nolle prosequi. The court may, either upon its own motion or
upon application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order any
criminal prosecution to be dismisssed; but in such case the reason of the dismissal
must be set forth in the order, which must be entered upon the record. No prosecuting
attorney shall hereafter discontinue or abandon a prosecution except as provided in
this section."
8 56 Wash. 131, 105 Pac. 234 (1909).
9 56 Wash. at 132, 105 Pac. at 235.
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is an exception to the common law rule).o The court found that the
dismissal involved was not required in the interests of justice; it was
granted in error"-hence the dismissal was not proper under RCW
10.46.090. Under RCW 10.43.010 (quoted above), 2 the only relevant
exception to the operation of the doctrine of double jeopardy is a
dismissal granted "in furtherance of justice" under RCW 10.46.090.
Since the dismissal in Kinghorn was not granted under RCW 10.46.090,
it was not within the only relevant exception to the operation of the
double jeopardy rule." Since the state could not appeal the first dis-
missal, 4 there was no way for the state to obtain review of the error
of the trial court in the first instance.
Subsequent to the Kingorn case, the 1925 legislature enacted a
statute granting the state certain rights of appeal:
In criminal cases the state may appeal to the supreme court, upon
giving the same notice as is required of other parties, when the error
complained of is based on the following: (1) The setting aside of an
indictment or information; (2) The sustaining of a demurrer to an
indictment or information; (3) An order arresting judgment on any
grounds; (4) An order granting to anyone, convicted by a jury, a new
trial on any grounds; (5) Any order which in effect abates or deter-
mines the action, or discontinues the same, otherwise than by an acquit-
tal of the defendant by a jury: Provided, That in no case shall the
state have a right to an appeal where the defendant has been acquitted
by a considered verdict of a jury.:"
State v. Brunn6 was the first case where the court considered the
relationship between the newly enacted appeals statute and the prior
statutory provisions. In this case, a prosecution for receiving stolen
goods was dismissed by order of the court on the ground that the
evidence was not sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. Upon finding
that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, the supreme court
reversed the order of dismissal and remanded the case for a new trial.
1o State v. Johnson, 24 Wash. 75, 63 Pac. 1124 (1901).
1156 Wash. 131, 105 Pac. 234 (1909).
12 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
13 Cf. State v. Ulmo, 19 Wn.2d 663, 143 P.2d 862 (1943). (RCW 10.73.020 was not
considered. See text accompanying notes 15-20 infra.)
14 The state did not have the right of appeal until 1925, when RCW 10.73.020 was
adopted. This statute is now in force as WASH. RULES, APPEAL 14(8), 34A Wn.2d
20, 21 (1950). See note 15 infra and accompanying text.
15 Wash. Ex. Sess. Laws 1925, ch. 150, § 7, codified as RCW 10.73.020, and now
adopted verbatim as WASH. RULES, APPEAL 14(8), 34A Wn.2d 20, 21 (1950).
'122 Wn.2d 120, 154 P.2d 826, 157 A.L.R. 1049 (1945).
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It specifically overruled State v. Kingkorn& 7 and State v. Ulmo.'8 The
court rejected a constitutional challenge to the new act, stating that
"the wording of the act plainly indicates that its dominant purpose was
to abolish the finality of one-man acquittals."'" The court held that
this purpose was well within the constitutional limits of Palko v.
Connecticut."
Following the Brunn case, the Washington court had several oppor-
tunities to consider the scope and operation of the statutory scheme
of double jeopardy. In State v. Portee,2' the court held that a directed
verdict granted on the motion of the defendant is appealable under
the statute. The court reasoned that a directed verdict is an "order
which ... abates ... the action otherwise than by an acquittal ... by
a jury" within the meaning of the statute, because it amounts to a
verdict by the judge instead of the jury.2 2 The court has also held
that the state may appeal from an order of dismissal, with or with-
out,2 4prejudice. The nature of the dismissal (directed verdict, mis-
trial, dismissal with prejudice, etc.) is unimportant in determining the
application of the statutory rules of double jeopardy. So too is the
character of the moving party (prosecutor, defense counsel, or the
court). When the court grants dismissal "in furtherance of justice,"2
the statute makes no distinction on the basis of who is the moving
party. Consequently, the fact that the dismissal in Connors was
granted by the court on its own motion does not distinguish the case
from Kinghorn or other cases where the prosecution sought the dis-
missal.
The dissent in Connors points out that the case is on all fours with
Kinghorn and that Kinghorn has been overruled.2" This appears to be
an accurate statement of the law, the implicit and logical extension of
which is that any appeal by the state under the provisions of WAsHr.
RULES, APPEAL 14(8) should be dismissed as moot. If the supreme
court were to have reversed the dismissal, there would have been a
retrial under the rule of State v. Brunn.2 7 If the supreme court were
"7 56 Wash. 131, 105 Pac. 234 (1909).
's 19 Wn.2d 663, 143 P2d 862 (1943).
19 22 Wn.2d at 137, 154 P2d at 834.
20 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
2125 Wn2d 246, 170 P.2d 326 (1946).
22 25 Wn.2d at 248, 249, 170 P.2d at 327.
23 State ex rel. Clark v. Hogan, 49 Wn.2d 457, 303 P.2d 290 (1956).24 State v. Buckman, 51 Wn2d 827, 322 P.2d 881 (1958).
25 RCW 10.46.090. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
20 59 Wn2d at 889, 371 P.2d at 548 (dissent).
27 22 Wn2d 120, 154 P.2d 826, 157 A.L.R. 1049 (1945). Accord, State v. Stacy, 43
Wn.2d 358, 261 P.2d 400 (1953).
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to hold that the dismissal was properly granted, the state could still
retry the defendant under the provisions of RCW 10.43.010.28 Since
a felony action ending in either a proper"9 or improper"0 dismissal can
never bar retrial, double jeopardy should never be at issue in an appeal
of a conviction on retrial.
Remaining for consideration are the vital policy questions which
led the Connors court to its apparent departure from settled law. This
problem is raised by the dissent which quotes extensively from the
Brunn case:
There was a period in England when many of the judges apparently
considered it their judicial duty to obtain convictions in all criminal
cases which came before them for trial. To that end, if it appeared
during the trial that the jury was not likely to convict, it became the
practice to discharge that jury, and impanel another, and in some cases,
a third or fourth if necessary. The tyranny and injustice of such a
procedure is obvious .... 31
In detailing the considerable extent to which judges of that period
participated in prosecutions, the dissent fails to mention that the statu-
tory scheme of double jeopardy would open the door to precisely the
same type of participation by trial court judges in Washington. Mod-
ern criminal procedure precludes any partisan participation by the
trial court on either side in the conduct of a criminal action. The
statutory Brunn rule would allow the court to dismiss at any point in
the proceeding on its own discretion, whether or not that discretion
was properly exercised.
Suppose a trial court were convinced both that the prosecution had
a meritorious case and that because of developments in the trial the
prosecution had only a slight chance of success. Under the rule al-
luded to, the trial court could aid the prosecution by granting a dis-
missal which would not be subject to appellate review on the motion
of the defendant.2 Even the opportunity for such an intervention by
the trial court appears to be an invasion of the adversary system.
When a judge ostensibly dismisses an action to protect the rights of
a defendant, and such dismissal is in error (as in Kinghorn, Connors,
and Brunn), the usual result is that the defendant's case is prejudiced
28 See RCW 10.43.010 at text accompanying note 6 supra.
29 Ibid.
30 State v. Stacy, 43 Wn.2d 358, 261 P.2d 400 (1953).
3159 Wn.2d at 892, 371 P.2d at 548 (dissent).




to some degree. Where the facts are identical with those of the Connors
case (dismissal before opening statement), the rule contended for by
the dissent could probably be applied without prejudice to the defend-
ant. At the opening-statement stage, the defendant reveals the theory
of his case. Past this point, any dismissal by the court will usually
prejudice the defendant's conduct of his defense in the second action
because the prosecution will be able to prepare its case to meet the
defense."3
The court did not explicitly consider or discuss these matters in the
Connors opinion. Such considerations appear to be material for they
furnish a rational basis for the application of the rule of Connors to
other fact situations where dismissal might prejudice a defendant be-
cause trial courts will be discouraged from participating in the conduct
of a trial in an adversary role. On the other hand, the Connors decision
will tend to discourage the trial court from ordering dismissals which,
in fact, would be in the interests of justice. It is suggested that the
court might have been more precise and should have framed a rule
giving further recognition and consideration to the policy arguments,
thereby giving the trial courts guidelines within which to resolve the
dilemma (between the statutory rules and the Connors decision).
DAVID W. SANDELL
Insanity Defense to First Degree Murder Charge-M'Naghten
Reaffirmed. Don Anthony White, a Negro in his mid-twenties, was
convicted of first degree murder by a King County jury. In State v.
White,1 the Washington Supreme Court (three judges dissenting) af-
firmed the conviction and sentence which directed that the death pen-
alty be imposed.
At trial, the defendant admitted beating the deceased woman in the
laundry room of the Yesler housing project on the morning of Decem-
ber 24, 1959. It was established that she died as a result of this beat-
ing. The accused defended on the basis of mental irresponsibility.2
The evidence established that defendant White had never seen or
known of the victim prior to the fatal beating. An exhaustive presenta-
33 Note that a rule to the effect that a dismissal will bar a second action only if the
defense has made its opening statement would force defense counsel to make an opening
statement in every case, thus further implicating the court in trial tactics.
1 160 Wash. Dec. 554, 374 P2d 942 (1962).
2 RCW 10.76.010 provides: "Any person who shall have committed a crime while
insane, or in a condition of mental irresponsibility, and in whom such insanity or men-
tal irresponsibility continues to exist, shall be deemed criminally insane ...." RCW
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